Running head: VALUES IN COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY

VALUES IN COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY:

A FRAMEWORK FOR REVIEW AND RENEWAL

Isaac Prilleltensky

Wilfrid Laurier University

Author Notes

Support for this research has been provided by Human Resources Development Canada.

I want to thank Claire Chamberland, Marie Claire Laurendeau, Geoff Nelson, and Leslea Peirson for stimulating conversations on the topic of this article. Correspondence concerning this article may be sent to Isaac Prilleltensky, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3C5. Electronic mail may be sent to iprillel@wlu.ca.

VALUES IN COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY:

A FRAMEWORK FOR REVIEW AND RENEWAL

Abstract

Three pillars of community psychology are values, research, and action. Compared to the last two, questions of values receive relatively little attention. Despite community psychology's firm commitment to values such as empowerment, respect for human diversity and social justice, we rarely probe the foundations of our principles. It is not often that we ask fundamental questions such as what are our central values and what are some contradictions between discourse and action. The paper presents a framework for identification and implementation of values based on philosophical, contextual, needs, and pragmatic considerations. These complementary considerations indicate that a balance is required among personal, collective, and relational values. I offer several illustrative applications of how the framework can be used to evaluate and guide value-based community practice.

VALUES IN COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY:

A FRAMEWORK FOR REVIEW AND RENEWAL

We teach many courses on methods, statistics, social problems, theory, and social interventions, but few, if any, on values. We expect journal authors to give a detailed account of the statistics employed in their research, but there is not a demand to justify their values. We are expected to prove to funders that interventions have an impact on health, but not necessarily on the values of the community.

Graduate students in community psychology are well versed in various methodological approaches to research, and in the merits of different social interventions. However, they could not easily critique liberal or communitarian social policies. This is despite the fact that trends in social policy and community services are highly influenced by these competing philosophies. Whereas questions about methods are typically well formulated, questions about values remain inchoate and embryonic (Prilleltensky, 1997). I believe this is the case because academic and professional traditions pressure us to concentrate on the science and not on the morals of our actions (Dokecki, 1996). Hence, students are capable of questioning the validity and reliability of instruments, but I am not sure they would know what criteria to employ to assess the comparative worth of values.

I submit that a framework for the identification and implementation of values can help us evaluate the benefits and shortcomings of different tenets. Value-literacy, which is just as important as methodological sophistication, can be enhanced by systematic attention to philosophical, contextual, needs, and pragmatic considerations. These four considerations form the basis of a framework designed to help us choose values and assess their standing in community psychology.

The framework I propose can be used to select values, to weigh their differential merit in different contexts, and to guide programs and policies in line with community psychology principles. I start by presenting the framework and assessing community psychology's attention to basic criteria in value selection. Based on criteria stipulated in the framework, I then present three sets of complementary values needed to fulfil community psychology's goals: personal, collective, and relational values. I make an attempt to evaluate to what extent our field has paid attention to these three sets of inter-related values. I conclude the paper with a section on applications, discussing value-based social analysis, social change, programs and policies. Throughout the paper I provide practical tools for the application of the precepts contained in the conceptual framework.

The unique contribution of the framework is that it integrates considerations that are typically studied in isolation. When thinking about values, community psychologists typically pay attention to needs, philosophers to moral theory, sociologists to norms, and activists to social change. The paper offers a way of integrating seemingly disparate but highly complementary deliberations in the formulation and application of values. In community psychology we have often invoked one set of considerations at a time, and have rarely seen how the various parameters I offer in the framework come together. The need to overcome fragmentary analyses of values is the driving force behind this proposal. The framework I suggest incorporates multiple voices, combines research and action, draws on various disciplines, pays attention to power and contextual considerations, and can be applied to guide and examine community psychology practice. My work articulates criteria and considerations for a framework of values that is in line with the main goals of community psychology; a project that, in my view, deserves more attention than it has received so far. The outcome of this endeavour may be more clarity with respect to our values, easier recognition of contradictions, and greater consistency between our values and our practice. My objective, in short, is to propose a framework for review and renewal of community psychology values.

Framework

Complementary Considerations for Values in Community Psychology

Kekes (1993) defines values as Ahumanly caused benefits that human beings provide to others. . . . By way of illustration, we may say that love and justice are moral goods@ (p. 44). Kekes provides an abstract concept of values as well as concrete illustrations. This is a useful point departure for thinking about values.

Values guide the process of working towards a desired state of affairs. These are precepts that inform our personal, professional, and political behavior. But values are not only beneficial in that they guide behavior towards a future outcome, for they also have intrinsic merit. We espouse values like empowerment, caring, and solidarity, not just because they lead towards a good or better society, but also because they have merit on their own (Hill Collins, 1993; Kane, 1994; Kekes, 1993). Indeed, according to Mayton, Ball-Rokeach and Loges (1994), Avalues may be defined as enduring prescriptive or proscriptive beliefs that a specific mode of conduct (instrumental value) or end state of existence (terminal value) is preferred to another mode of conduct or end state@ (p. 3). Schwartz (1994) points out that values Aserve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity@ (p.21). Values, then, are the principles that guide our actions, but the question remains: how do we choose our values?

Criteria for building a framework of values

I submit that values should derive from a set of complementary considerations that respond, in turn, to a set of criteria. A framework for values should be based, in my opinion, on a balancing act. This balancing act is aimed at reaching an equilibrium between competing ideas. In essence, balance is needed between (a) theoretical and grounded input, (b) understanding and action, (c) processes and outcomes, and (d) differing and unequal voices. Why do we need a balance between these seemingly opposing but complementary philosophical orientations?

A balance between theoretical and grounded input is needed to complement deductive with inductive approaches to knowledge. Abstract philosophical analyses of what values can lead to a good life and a good society are useful but limited. One reason for the limitation of philosophical analyses is that Ato cover a wide range of cases, ethical principles typically are formulated at a high level of abstraction and consequently leave much room for individual discretion@ (Jaggar, 1994, p. 9). Feminist philosopher Alison Jaggar goes on to say that individual discretion is always required to determine which principle or principles are appropriate for a given situation and, in cases of conflict between them, which principles should take precedence over others....The consideration of particular cases thus plays an indispensable role in formulating moral principles. (Jaggar, 1994, p. 9)

What good is it to have an internally consistent framework of values that does not reflect the living realities of most people? The corollary of this question is that moral philosophy is not enough. On the other hand, we can ask what is the point of knowing people's needs and aspirations if that knowledge is not processed into principles and guidelines for action? The main corollary of this question is that grounded knowledge is not enough (Kane, 1998).

Moral philosophy and grounded experience are complementary. Theories of values have to be validated with lived experience. Otherwise, we can end up with notions that are theoretically flawless but practically worthless. This is a serious risk, for as Bowden (1997) contends, in grand theories of ethics, Aattention to the messy contingencies of concrete situations is set aside in favour of the theoretical project of organizing moral knowledge under general principles and rules of conduct that exhibit the exactness and formality of mathematics@ (p. 3). When proposing a set of values, it is crucial to appreciate the Adynamic complexity and diversity of specific situations, and the particular needs, desires, intellectual and emotional habits of the persons participating in them@ (Bowden, 1997, p. 3). A framework for values should strive to answer Toulmin=s call for an approach that is Aparticular not universal, local not general, timely not eternal, and -- above all -- concrete not abstract@ (1996, p. 7).

This is not to undermine the importance of conceptualization. Theory is needed to reflect on potential conflicts among competing values. We can appreciate a community psychologist advocating for empowerment, but we should remember that too much self-determination can lead to preoccupation with rights and neglect of social obligations. Personal control and sense of community are not always compatible goals. We need to conceptualize the values that are conducive to a good life and a good society, for without organizing schemes we can easily become confused as to what values should take precedence in real-life contexts.

The balance between theory and grounded input is also required to scrutinize people's wishes. Asking people what they regard important in life is essential, but not enough to guide action, for the simple reason that people can wish upon others objectionable and reprehensible things. This is why we need philosophical critique of people=s voices as much as grounded validation of conceptual frameworks.

A balance between understanding and action is needed to ensure that knowledge does not remain the sole object of intellectual interest. The ultimate purpose of values like love and justice is, to go back to Kekes (1993), to enjoy a fuller life. To make an impact in the world, our theoretical sophistication has to be followed by action, a principle inscribed in the very name of the division of community psychology of the American Psychological Association: The Society for Community Research and Action.

But the urge to act should be tempered by the need to know; to know our goals, and the risks and benefits of pursuing one course of action and not another. Understanding pertains not only to the internal consistency of any set of values, but also to the context of application. Whereas one set of values may be appropriate to one social context, it may be inimical to the well being of people in another setting. Thus, while we promote more autonomy and control for disadvantaged people in oppressively controlling environments, we do not want to push for more self-determination of violent people in disorganized societies. Blind adherence to any value, from personal empowerment to sense of community, is risky. Actions to promote personal control, for instance, have to be considered in light of social repercussions.

A balance between processes and outcomes is needed to ensure that dialogue is not an end in itself. By the same token, we need to assert that ends do not automatically justify the means. If the object of an intervention is to uphold the rights of a minority group, do we justify any means, including terrorism? On the other hand, can we justify endless talk when the lives of vulnerable children and families in conflict zones are at risk? These are very difficult questions for which there are never easy solutions, but the tension between valid processes and just outcomes should be reflected in any framework of values.

A balance between differing and unequal voices is the fourth criteria for constructing a framework. Social policies and programs that have an impact on the health and welfare of the population are typically formulated by powerful politicians, educated government officials, and privileged academics. Efforts by community psychologists to work in partnership with disadvantaged members of society are not typical of social policy formation (MacGillivary, Nelson, & Prilleltensky, 1998). Quite the contrary, most social policies are conceived in the absence of meaningful input from those most affected by them (Taylor, 1996; Wharf & McKenzie, 1998). Hence, a framework of values should be attentive to differing voices and in particular to those who are often rendered invisible by the political process. Unequal power and unequal representation must be considered in proposing values. Values that are based on the voice of the powerful will irrevocably perpetuate the status quo. Values that are based on the voice of the powerless have a chance of promoting social justice (Jaggar, 1994).

The difficulty of balancing competing criteria in the creation of a framework is matched only by the difficulty in balancing competing considerations within the framework itself. The framework I propose consists of four complementary considerations: philosophical, contextual, needs, and pragmatic. These four sets of considerations are an attempt to meet the criteria for building a sound framework of values.

Table 1 shows the four sets of considerations with their respective unique features. Each set answers a key question, deals with a particular subject, represents a particular voice, calls on different analytical and disciplinary resources, and leads to a specific outcome. I discuss next the unique contributions of each set of considerations. Following a presentation of their distinctness I offer reasons for their inseparable and mutually enhancing nature.

Philosophical considerations

Moral and political philosophers debate what is the good life, what is the good society, and how to get there. They explain the merits and drawbacks of diverse tenets, the conditions under which one value may supersede another, potential contradictions among competing orientations to the good life, and the like. These philosophers spend considerable time trying to formulate coherent visions of the good society. These considerations answer the question what should be? Philosophers contribute to the discussion on values by portraying an ideal vision of what we should strive for; they can provide a blueprint of a better society in which values of autonomy and community will be mutually enhanced (Etzioni, 1996).

To illustrate the relevance of philosophical considerations in selecting values for community psychology we can examine the liberal-communitarian debate, a very current debate in social and political philosophy and one that has direct repercussions for social policy. Not surprisingly, philosophers differ among themselves with respect to visions of the good life and the good society. Liberal philosophers, for instance, emphasize autonomy, self-determination, and the rights of the individual. They are reluctant to promote too much state intervention because they are afraid that governments will end up dictating to private citizens how to run their lives. Communitarian thinkers, on the other hand, claim that we have gone too far in meeting the needs of individuals and that we have sacrificed our social obligations in the pursuit of private satisfaction (Etzioni, 1993, 1996; Lerner, 1996; Mulhall & Swift, 1996; Sandel, 1996; Shapiro, 1995). Communitarian philosophers argue that for citizens to fulfil their dreams they need one another. A vision of mutual help and commitment to the welfare of the collective benefits the individual as well, for the attainment of one=s aims depends on collaboration from others.

Each position poses risks as well as benefits (Avineri & De-Shalit, 1992; Kymlicka, 1990; Sandel, 1984). Liberals deserve recognition for promoting the liberation of individuals from oppressive social norms and regulations. This school of thought advances the right of the citizen to pursue his or her dreams without undue interference from others. For as long as a person=s desires and actions do not cause undue interference with the wishes of others, he or she is free to pursue a private dream. Liberty and freedom are the core concepts of liberal thinking.

These worthy ideals notwithstanding, this philosophy is not without risks. In excess, the pursuit of private goals can lead to unmitigated individualism, selfishness, and materialism (Bauman, 1993; Etzioni, 1996; Leonard, 1997). AWhen people pursue private goals, the risk is that they may never acquire an ennobling sense of a purpose beyond the self@ (Damon, 1995, p. 66). A creed that sanctions personal advancement above all can easily deteriorate, as has happened in our society, into rampant individualism. ALooking out for number one@ translates into fierce competition and disregard for the welfare of others (Kohn, 1986). Autonomy, voice, and choice, have to be closely monitored, lest they turn into a selfish preoccupation with one=s own power. This risk is very apparent in market societies where state intervention is minimal and the powerful is free to seek pleasure at the expense of others (Leonard, 1997). Not everyone in society has the same amount of power, and those with less power have fewer opportunities to advocate for themselves and to pursue chosen goals without undue restrictions, a condition obviated by many liberal thinkers (O'Neill, 1994).

Communitarian thinking is based on the assumption that without cooperation individuals cannot achieve their private goals. Like liberals, they endorse the fulfilment of personal goals and the liberation from oppressive social forces; but unlike liberals, they think that we should strengthen social and communal institutions because personal happiness is not possible without them (Etzioni, 1993, 1996; Haste, 1996). Liberals freed us from coercive institutions, but along the way they weakened even those institutions we really need to promote not only the good of the collective, but also the good of the individual (O=Neill, 1994; Sandel, 1996). Hence, communitarian thinking strives to restore a balance between the pursuit of private and collective aims. We know that strong communities provide a better environment for children than weak communities. Essential public programs, sufficiently funded and effectively managed can have long lasting and beneficial effects on all children (Schorr, 1989, 1997).

But communitarian thinking is not without risks either. Collectivist societies are known for expecting great sacrifices from their members for the benefit of the public good. Citizens feel coerced to do things they don=t like and they experience state intervention as oppressive (Melnyk, 1985). The Israeli kibbutz, for instance, used to expect a great deal of personal sacrifice from its members. While this demand was reasonable in the early stages of the kibbutz, when communal effort was essential to the survival of the collective, this expectation became too onerous in later years. Members denounced expectations for heavy personal concessions and started to request more personal freedoms. This realization led to more liberal policies regarding employment, family practices, and opportunities for personal development.

Liberal and communitarian thinking are two examples of the moral and philosophical thinking that should inform our framework. They are particularly important because they guide a great deal of current social policy (Etzioni, 1993, 1996; Loizou, 1996). Our implicit and explicit notions of what constitutes the good life and the good society is going to have an impact on the programs and policies we develop for children, youth, and communities. Convincing philosophical positions notwithstanding, they are insufficient to mount social policies that meet the needs of families, children, and communities. An ever present danger in philosophical discourse is its detachment from the social conditions in which people live. To counteract this risk we need to explore the contextual circumstances that complement philosophical considerations.

Contextual considerations

This set of considerations explores what is the actual state of affairs in which people live. Community psychologists and social scientists strive to understand what are the social, economic, cultural, and political conditions of a specific community. This line of inquiry helps us to determine social norms and cultural trends influencing people's choices and behavior (Trickett, 1996). A contextual assessment is necessary to understand the subjective experience of residents of a particular community. Individualist and collectivist societies differ markedly with respect to socialization, customs, and visions of the good society. Poor and rich communities vary with regards to the importance they ascribe to basic necessities. Different ethnic communities celebrate unique traditions and uphold distinct values. An analysis of culture and context draws on resources from history, anthropology, sociology, communications, economics, and cultural studies. These sources of information combine to provide a picture of the context in which we want to promote certain values. Knowing the context will help us determine the most appropriate values for a particular situation.

Values attain their meaning within a social context. The meaning of self-determination in an individualist society is vastly different from its connotation in a collectivist environment. In a totally collectivist society, citizens yearn for more autonomy and resent state and communal intrusion. Examples include Acurtailing individual rights in the name of community needs; suppressing creativity in the name of conformity; and even suppressing a sense of self, losing individuality in a mesh of familial or communal relations@ (Etzioni, 1996, p. 26). In an individualist environment, on the other hand, citizens wish to experience more sense of community and less selfishness.

We understand values more fully when we comprehend the set of circumstances within which they are embedded (Avineri & De-Shalit, 1992; Bell, 1993; Etzioni, 1993; Sandel, 1996).

Pushed to extremes, values lose their merit. Excessive collectivism violates one=s right to privacy, while flagrant individualism numbs our sensitivity to others and leads to desolation. It is incumbent upon us, then, to watch out for signs of value immoderation (Kane, 1994). The moment one principle takes too much space, others shrink proportionately. Applied to North American society, this means that collectivist values such as solidarity, sharing, co-operation, and social justice have shrunk in reverse proportion to the increase in individualism (Saul, 1995). This trend is reflected in conservative preventive programs and policies that concentrate on person-centred approaches (Albee, 1996; Albee & Perry, 1995).

To reach a balance of values that is sensitive to the social context, it is our task to evaluate the salience of each desirable value. In our social environment, the eminence of individualism has led to the obscurity of collectivism. What=s the solution? A full swing towards the collectivist end of the spectrum is not advisable, for we would confront another conundrum. A creative equilibrium that would foster the rights of the individual and the needs of the community is a more tenable approach. This is why we should favour a perspective that empowers the person to claim his or her rights in full consideration of societal obligations. Entitlements and duties do not have to be mutually exclusive (Etzioni, 1993, 1996; Lerner, 1996)

Such an approach, congruent with the tenets of community psychology, seeks a balance between self-determination and distributive justice, and shows high degrees of concern for the well-being of individuals and communities alike. This philosophy envisions a good life and a good society built on mutuality, social obligations, strong public institutions, and the removal of oppression. Emancipating every member of the community and nurturing a sense of solidarity are the foundations of this vision (Frazer & Lacey, 1993), a vision congruent with feminist and community psychology principles (Bond, 1997; Mulvey, 1988; Montero, 1994, Rappaport, 1977; Prilleltensky & Nelson, 1997; Riger, 1993; Wilkinson, 1997).

Needs considerations

Philosophical and contextual considerations have to be infused with real life sentiments. It is not enough for philosophers to ponder what the rest of us need, or for social scientists to recommend what will make our communities a better place to live. What good is it to have an internally consistent set of principles that does not reflect the realities and desires of most people? Philosophical tenets have to be validated with the lived experience of community members and with the knowledge of social scientists (Kane, 1998; Montero, 1998). It is only when most people attest to the benefits of having voice and choice that the abstract notion of self-determination becomes palpable.

Needs considerations contribute to the framework by answering the question what is missing and what is a desirable state of affairs for community members. This set of considerations pays explicit attention to the voice of the people with whom we partner to improve their well-being. Community psychology is uniquely placed to elicit the needs of people in position of disadvantage. Grounded theory and lived experience serve to identify basic human needs of people in context.

Qualitative studies of people=s struggles, aspirations, conflicts, frustrations, and joys provide a picture of what people regard worthwhile in life; parents disclose their doubts about how to raise children, children share their fears and pleasures, and minorities relate experiences of discrimination. These accounts disclose their needs and aspirations.

By asking people what they want, need, and consider meaningful in life, we learn about the ingredients of an appealing vision. This is not to say that whatever people say should be acceptable. For it is quite conceivable that the majority of people in a society may be wrong, or malicious. History could prove that majorities are capable of endorsing and enacting vicious attitudes. Just like philosophical arguments have to be checked against human needs, human needs have to be subjected to careful philosophical scrutiny. This ensures that human desires are tested for their moral validity. What we have, then, is a dialectical process of eliciting moral values through philosophical and empirical means, and examining each set of values for their philosophical clarity and empirical validity. Grounded input should be assessed using moral criteria, while philosophical notions should be verified through studies of human needs.

Pragmatic considerations

Whereas the previous sets of considerations examined actual, ideal, and desirable states of affairs in society, pragmatic considerations concern feasible change. Unlike previous deliberations, which asked what is, what is missing, or what should be, the main question answered by this set of considerations is what could be done. This question is meant to bridge the gap between the actual state of affairs on one hand, and desirable and ideal visions on the other. Feasible change draws our attention to what social improvements can be realistically accomplished -- a distinct political goal.

This set of considerations meets the criterion stipulated earlier for balancing research and action. By reflecting on previous efforts at social change and learning from agents of change we can hope to close the gap between the ideal and the actual. A specific outcome of pragmatic thinking is a plan for social action.

Agents of change translate moral values and grounded input into action. These are the professionals, para-professionals, politicians, volunteers and activists who combine values with human experience to improve the welfare of a particular population. Agents of change strive to promote wellness by combining values with knowledge of what people want, need, and regard important in life. Agents of change bridge between the abstract notions of philosophers and the lived experience of children, parents, and community members. They try to adapt ideals of the good society to specific contextual realities. In that sense, all of us who work in communities are agents of change.

Within the social sciences in general and within psychology in particular, community psychology is one of the few disciplines explicitly concerned with oppression and social change (Prilleltensky & Gonick, 1994; Rappaport, 1977). This is a unique feature of our field that requires and deserves further impetus (Bond, 1997; Chavis & Wolff, 1993; Prilleltensky & Nelson, 1997). By virtue of its indispensable role in the proposed framework of values, I hope that more attention will be given to this neglected but fundamental tenet of community psychology.

The complementary nature of the four sets of considerations now becomes apparent: without a philosophical analysis we lack a vision; without a contextual analysis we lack an understanding of social forces; without a needs assessment we lack an idea of what people want; and finally, without pragmatic thinking we lack a plan of action. The interdependence of these deliberations makes it impossible to privilege one sets of considerations over another.

Community Psychology's Attention to Complementary Considerations of Values

If our mission is to promote value-based social change (Bond, 1997; Montero, 1994; Rappaport, 1977; Prilleltensky & Nelson, 1997), we should feel confident about our values. If we believe that philosophical, contextual, needs, and pragmatic considerations are crucial in choosing values, then we should explore to what extent community psychologists pay attention to them. Table 2 offers a framework for evaluating community psychology's attention to complementary considerations of values. To reflect community psychology's concern for an ecological understanding of social phenomena, contextual, needs, and pragmatic considerations are further divided into micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis.

We can use the framework by determining our field's attention to each one of the issues on the left hand side of the table. Thus, we could speculate that community psychology pays only moderate attention to social and philosophical analyses of values, and that we are relatively uninformed about philosophical debates that affect social policy. At the level of pragmatic assessments, for instance, we could say that community psychology pays attention to change processes at the micro and meso levels, but that we could be more attuned to macro-social change. Placing a check mark along the range of low to high attention can stimulate discussion in our field about our priorities and future directions.

I attempt here only an exploratory assessment of community psychology's attention to the various issues identified in table 2. My evaluation is far from conclusive and is only meant to stimulate further discussion. I suggest that our field is stronger in the two middle rows (contextual and needs considerations) than in the top and bottom ones (philosophical and pragmatic). That is to say that our discipline is stronger in research than in action, and stronger in applied research than in philosophical and political scholarship. Let me elaborate.

Philosophical deliberations scrutinize the direction of our efforts; they make sure we are on course to reach a vision and that we do not work across purposes. This type of thinking identifies contradictions and limitations in our programs and policies; it fosters reflection and it serves as a meta-dialogue within our discipline. As such, it can help us determine the relative emphasis we put on the remaining three sets of considerations. Are we doing too much research on needs and not enough on processes of change? Are we describing in detail the culture of local communities but only superficially social and political norms?

Earlier tensions between empowerment and prevention (Rappaport, 1981, 1987), and more recent ones between empowerment and sense of community (Dokecki, 1996; Riger, 1993) are examples of philosophical discussions that help to reconsider the direction of our work. At present, I think that we could invest more effort in developing a coherent philosophical position that responds to the changing nature of social conditions. Should our agenda be the same as it was in the sixties and seventies, when the state offered support to the needy, or do we need to refocus to challenge the demise of the welfare state? (Leonard, 1997). Do we align ourselves with liberal individualist policies that place heavy responsibility on vulnerable people to help themselves, or do we make a strong political statement about the need to sustain vital community structures? While we endorse community supports, we often deal with the casualties of unfair social policies instead of strengthening civic institutions. The latter is more in line with a communitarian vision that we endorse implicitly but not quite practically yet. I believe we need to come to terms with the changing social landscape and realize that we have to develop a stronger philosophical position with respect to the role of the state in community wellness.

Community psychology is attentive to contextual considerations in varying degrees, depending on the level of analysis. In my view there is differential progress in our understanding of micro, meso, and macro contexts. I think we are clear on how personal, family, work and school contexts influence basic human needs and corresponding values, but I am not sure we have yet understood clearly the role of cultural and political norms in wellness (Levine, 1998). A similar observation can be made about research on needs. Whereas we inquire in needs assessments about personal, familial, and meso level needs, we seldom explore what changes should take place at the macro-level in order to foster basic human needs. The relative lack of attention to macro-level contextual considerations extends to pragmatic issues. In community psychology, pragmatic considerations leading to change are limited to micro and meso level institutions. The challenge of social change is still awaiting an operational paradigm (Chavis & Wolff, 1993).

Values

Choice of Specific Values

The four sets of considerations presented in table 1 serve as a guide for the selection of community psychology values. In addition to these general guidelines, values should meet more specific criteria. Values should be complementary and not contradictory. That is to say, they should be internally consistent. A set of values should also be comprehensive enough to cover the essential needs and wants of the community, and it should sustain the holistic development of its members.

We should avoid dogmatism and relativism in our selection of values. Dogmatism leads to the coercive enforcement and application of single sets of beliefs, an approach that undermines human diversity (Taylor, 1992; Trickett, 1996). At the same time, we should also avert complete relativism, for it grants equal merit to any set of values. The latter would paralyze us because we would have no criteria to praise or condemn competing orientations (Kane, 1994). Dogmatism and relativism are common traps in discussions about values; and although they present serious challenges to moral and practical philosophy, these impediments are not insurmountable (Bauman, 1993; Kane, 1994, 1998; Kekes, 1993; Lerner, 1996).

Values guide the processes and mechanisms that lead us to an ideal scenario. Therefore, the values we choose should be compatible with our vision; they should bring us closer to the desired end. Values should have intrinsic and extrinsic merit. They should have inherent moral goodness and at the same time work in concert with other values. Collaboration and democratic participation are intrinsically good features of a good society, but they are also constructive in that they enable self-determination. Human diversity also bolsters self-determination, for without appreciation for diverse social identities one=s unique aspirations cannot flourish. The point is that values should complement each other. Caring should complement justice, collaboration should complement democratic participation, and human diversity should complement self-determination. Just like the value of health cannot be fulfilled without access to preventive and medical resources, self-determination cannot be promoted without justice and access to social resources.

Personal, Collective, and Relational Values

Based on the criteria described above and on the guidelines presented in table 1, we are in a position to suggest some core values for community psychology. Core values for our field can be classified into three groups: (a) personal values (e.g., self-determination, autonomy, health and personal growth) (b) collective values (e.g., social justice, support for community structures), and (c) relational values (e.g., respect for human diversity, collaboration and democratic participation). These categories reflect the need to balance individual and social goals, as well as the need for dialogue in resolving conflicts of interests. There is a dialectic between personal and collective values; one kind cannot exist without the other. While this dialectic has been amply recognized (e.g., Bauman, 1993; Sandel, 1996), what is often missed in the literature is the need for relational values that mediate between the good of the individual and the good of the collective, a need that is often invoked in feminist (Frazer & Lacey, 1993; Hernández, 1997; Hill Collins, 1993) and native writings (Gunn Allen, 1993). Neither personal nor collective values can exist without mechanisms for connecting between them (Habermas, 1990; Putnam, 1996). Audre Lorde (1993) spoke eloquently about relationality and interdependency between women. Her writings illustrate the intimate connections between personal, collective, and relational values:

Interdependency between women is the way to a freedom which allows the I to be, not in order to be used, but in order to be creative. This is a difference between the passive be and the active being....Only within that interdependency of different strengths, acknowledged and equal, can the power to seek new ways of being in the world generate, as well as the courage and sustenance to act where there are no charters....As women, we have been taught either to ignore our differences, or to view them as causes for separation and suspicion rather than as forces for change. Without community there is no liberation (Lorde, 1993, p. 486).

Examples of personal values include autonomy, health, and personal growth. Social justice, a central collectivist value, refers to the fair and equitable allocation of bargaining powers, resources, and obligations in society; while support for community structures ensures that we have in place public sources of support. Two examples of relational values include collaboration and democratic participation and respect for human diversity.

These sets of values are premised on the assumption that strong communities benefit everyone. Whether we like it or not, the fulfilment of the self is linked to the contentment of the group. Violent neighbourhoods and families constrain personal well-being. Poorly resourced communities limit opportunities for health and development. High quality public institutions like schools and hospitals benefit the community at large. Accessible child care and affordable recreational facilities benefit children and families in low income neighbourhoods. Support for community structures and social justice in allocation of resources are examples of collectivist values because they enhance the quality of life for all citizens.

But collectivist values are needed not only to promote wellness, but to prevent problems as well. If we did not have rules to protect communities and individuals, the incidence of harm would increase. If we did not have rules against intoxicated driving, more innocent people would be killed. If we did not have rules against smoking in public spaces, more children would be affected by second-hand smoking. These and other collective norms are needed to protect citizens against potential abuses of power and excesses of individual rights.

In some cases, personal and collective values come into conflict. Smokers demand their right to engage in the habit, public health officials uphold the public good by imposing smoking bans; unprepared teenagers want to have babies, preventionists strive to avert teenage pregnancy. Ideally, personal and collective values would be mutually enhancing, but it is often the case that conflicts arise. This is why we should promote partnership values, values that uphold conflict resolution and collaboration (MacGillivary, Nelson, & Prilleltensky, 1998; Putnam, 1996). Unless we teach people how to negotiate differences, it is not realistic to expect social harmony.

Community Psychology's Attention to Personal, Collective, and Relational Values

In community psychology, concern for autonomy is reflected in efforts to promote psychological empowerment and a sense of mastery and control (Prilleltensky, 1994; Zimmerman, 1995; Zimmerman & Rappaport, 1988). The concepts of prevention, health promotion, skill enhancement and the pursuit of wellness exemplify the values of health and personal growth (Cowen, 1994; Rosenblum 1971). Concerns with justice and equality, political education and social change movements reflect the value of social justice in community psychology (Albee, 1986; Prilleltensky & Nelson, 1997). Support for vital community structures is expressed in efforts to launch and preserve informal and formal networks of supports (Gottlieb, 1981; 1983; Lavoie, Borkman, & Gidron, 1994).

Although it is clear that community psychology pays attention to personal, collective and relational values, it is important to determine just how much attention and what type of attention we are talking about. Is our level of interest in social justice high or low? Is our interest in such a value at the level of discourse or also at the level of action? To help us answer these questions I propose in table 3 a framework for evaluating community psychology's attention to personal, collective, and relational values. As with table 2, in which I subdivided some categories into ecological levels, in table 3 I also subdivide relational and collective values into micro, meso, and macro-levels of analysis.

Using the tool provided in table 3 I can offer some initial thoughts on the status of values in our discipline. I believe the distinction between discourse and action is crucial because we often write about values but we do not always act on them. With regards to personal values, I believe that we place high emphasis on personal well being and that there is congruence between discourse and action. Many community-based and prevention programs are designed to enhance the level of skills and knowledge of individuals on a particular topic, such as parenting, drug-abuse, social skills, and assertiveness. In fact, it has been argued that most prevention programs tend to be person-centered (Albee, 1996; Albee & Perry, 1995; Cowen, 1985; Levine, 1998), an observation that confirms our concern for personal wellness.

Relative to personal values, collective values occupy a background position in community psychology's agenda, particularly at the macro level of analysis. Although we exhort citizens and professionals to embrace concepts of community in our discourse (McMillan, 1996; Newbrough, 1995), in actual practice we promote community mainly by creating networks around particular topics, such as depression, drug-abuse prevention, or safe communities. These are important interventions but tend to be limited to the micro and meso levels. When it comes to promoting social justice and a fair distribution of societal resources, we look to others to fulfil the job. Prilleltensky and Nelson (1997) maintain that most of our efforts in community psychology are ameliorative -- as opposed to transformative -- in nature. Community interventions strive to alleviate suffering and to minimize the impact of unjust social policies, not to change society in order to prevent problems in the first place. More focussed attention to collective principles at the macro level, in both discourse and action, will bring us closer to the mission of community psychology.

Relational values are attended to at the micro and meso levels but not so much at the macro level (Riger, 1993; Surrey, 1991). I believe this is the case in both discourse and action. Whereas we develop techniques for collaboration and democratic participation in research and community programs (Kerruish, 1995; Nelson, Ochoka, Griffin, & Lord, 1997), we are not as attentive to social and political processes needed to ensure dialogue and conflict resolution at the macro-level. We concern ourselves with dispute resolution in small circles such as steering committees and community programs, but we are somewhat remiss in addressing class and racial differences that are being played out in the political arena. Relative to personal values, I suggest that relational values are not as central to our discourse and action as they should be. Learning to identify conflicts and to resolve them peacefully is perhaps one of the most urgent social tasks of our time.

Illustrative Applications

The next three sections explain how we can apply the frameworks presented in tables 1, 2, and 3, for the promotion of value-based (a) social analysis, (b) social change, and (c) programs and policies.

Value-Based Social Analysis

Tables 4 and 5 combine the subjects of analysis described in table 1 (ideal vision, actual and desirable states of affairs, and feasible change) with personal, collective, and relational values to describe the balance of power among values in two different societies. Once we know the actual and desirable states, as well as the ideal vision, we can work towards feasible change. The feasible is always an attempt to bridge between the ideal on the one hand, and the actual and the desirable on the other. The feasible is the realm of political action for social change. Table 4 presents a potential balance of power among values in an individualistic society like North America. In such a society the actual level of personal values like self-determination is typically very high, and the level of collective values like social justice very low (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Leonard, 1997; Saul, 1995). Based on sociological studies (Etzioni, 1993, 1996) I would predict that people have a high need for personal values but also yearn for a more cohesive community, as expressed in the desirable state of affairs. I submit that personal and collective values should be at moderate levels of endorsement, as seen in the ideal vision. Practically speaking, I think that it is feasible to work towards moderate levels of collective values, but I am not sure that we can easily lower the high level of personal values. This is reflected in the feasible state of affairs in table 4. Too many forces in capitalist societies militate against lowering levels of individualism in favor of collectivism (Leonard, 1997; Lerner, 1996).

Studies of contemporary culture indicate that relational values such as dialogue and participation in civic debates are not highly regarded (Kohn, 1986). In fact, their standing is quite low. It is hard to determine whether people would want more dialogue in person-centered societies, for there is a basic lack of civic literacy and interest (Macedo, 1994). Hence, I put a question mark in the desirable column of relational values, signifying that it is hard to hypothesize how people would respond to a request for more dialogue. Ideally, relational values should feature prominently in any society, and it is not unrealistic to educate the next generation on the benefits and skills of civic participation and conflict resolution (Berman, 1997; Damon, 1995; Youniss & Yates, 1997).

Table 5 presents a potential configuration of values in a collectivist society. Notice that the ideal column remains the same as in table 4, for, as Etzioni (1996) amply documented, an equilibrium between personal and collective values is needed in either type of society; an equilibrium that is sustained by strong relational and communicative values (Habermas, 1990; Surrey, 1991).

Unlike the scenario in table 4, in a strong collectivist society people experience lower levels of freedom and autonomy and may wish higher degrees of self-determination. By the same token, they may experience high levels of conformity. In this type of environment, citizens are likely to experience high expectations for social participation as somewhat intrusive and would be happier if left alone a little more (Melnyk, 1985).

This kind of value-based social analysis can help community psychologists to discern what are the prevailing social norms, what are their impact on different groups, and what changes to promote in order to reach a more desirable state of affairs. This framework can be applied at various levels of analysis, from an organization to a community to a country. In each setting there is likely to be a struggle between personal and collective interests necessitating a big or small dose of relational values. Once a community psychologist identifies the balance of power among personal, collective, and relational values in the actual, ideal, and desirable states of affairs, an action plan can be devised to attain feasible change.

Value-Based Social Change

We saw in table 1 how different sets of value considerations relate to different states of affairs; philosophical analyses point to the ideal, contextual analyses to the actual, and needs assessments to the desirable, while pragmatic considerations point towards feasible change. Figure 1 shows how the four different conditions interact to promote social change. According to the figure, people's accounts of desirable states of affairs are based on the actual and the ideal. These three conditions, the actual, ideal, and desirable, inform social change.

Figure 1 shows the feedback loop stemming from, and leading to, social change. Once a social change is achieved, this novel state of affairs has an impact on the newly defined actual state of affairs. The change also creates new expectations concerning the ideal vision. If a society swings from being too permissive to being too authoritarian, the new ideal would be to regain personal freedoms. This new ideal, in turn, redefines what is desirable, and another process of change is set in motion.

The implication of this model for community psychology is that values and states of affairs are very dynamic. Whatever type of social change that takes place, progressive or regressive, planned or unplanned, is bound to redefine what people value and need. Neither cultures nor values are static; they are in flux, and even though each community has its own enduring features, the social scientist should be mindful not to transfer expectations from one community to another, or from one period of time to another, without examining local and current conditions. It would be a mistake to promote changes, however well-intentioned, without checking with the people affected whether the changes reflect their current needs and aspirations. A community psychologist's ideal for a particular community may differ drastically from the self-defined aspirations of the group itself. By the same token, the group's ideals and needs may change from time to time, forcing the community psychologist to check with stakeholders not just once, but rather often, what is the actual state of affairs, and how needs may have changed from the previous inquiry. This requirement is not unlike a therapeutic or group process in which a check-in takes place every time there is an encounter. The dynamic nature of social life requires that we adapt our goals to changing conditions.

Value-Based Programs and Policies

Perhaps the most obvious implication of value-based practice is for programs and policies. If we agree that our interventions should procure an equilibrium among personal, collective, and relational values, we should develop guidelines that prevent excessive emphasis on one kind of value at the expense of another. Table 6 provides a summary of such guidelines.

To illustrate how we can balance the three types of values in dealing with a concrete challenge, I refer the reader to table 7. In that table I propose programs and policies for the promotion of child and family wellness. By addressing each value in both policies and programs, we ensure that our efforts are not limited to the micro or meso levels of intervention but target also macro level variables like national policies. This table can be used as a template in devising value-based interventions in multiple settings (e.g., schools, workplace, hospitals, communities) and with a variety of foci (e.g., health promotion, drug-abuse prevention, teen pregnancy, formal and informal support, minority rights, child abuse).

Summary and Conclusion

Values are guidelines for helping others (Baier, 1973; Kekes, 1993). Community psychologists are interested in values that promote the well-being of disadvantaged people. However, given that people=s needs vary according to their particular circumstances, it is nearly impossible to formulate a universal list of values (Giddens, 1994; Kane, 1994, 1998; Kekes, 1993). Hence, we must remember that any proposed set of values contains contextual limitations. We should also recognize that some groups may require certain values more than others. Whereas low-income people may need financial support more than signs of compassion, high-income people with a disability may need emotional support more than material help. Keeping in mind that the context determines the set of values that is required is a good antidote against the dogmatic application of values. Asking people themselves what they need goes a long way to ensure that we do not impose on them inappropriate values.

Prilleltensky and Nelson (1997) suggested that advancing the well‑being of oppressed groups requires actualizing all values in a balanced way. We need to remember that within a given social ecology some values appear at the foreground of our consciousness while others remain in the background. To attain the necessary balance among the various values, we must move the neglected values to the foreground. Within the present North American social context, this means relocating the value of social justice from the background to the foreground, and pushing the obsession with personal advancement from the foreground to the background. If we keep neglecting social justice and our collective duties we will merely reinforce the same unjust state of affairs that perpetuates oppression, whereas if we keep exalting self-determination we will undermine any possible sense of community.

It is also crucial to distinguish between ameliorating living conditions within the present social structure and transforming the conditions that create and perpetuate oppression. Caring should not be limited to meeting people=s basic necessities on a charitable basis. Caring should entail a commitment to changing negative social conditions so that charity becomes obsolete.

Compassion at the interpersonal level is both wonderful and insufficient. There is a definite need to expand the implementation of values from micro and meso contexts to macro social ecologies. Otherwise, our efforts at caring will be perpetually undermined by structural conditions of injustice. Alleviating suffering is a commendable social cause, but there comes a point where amelioration by itself works against the eradication of oppressive conditions. Efforts should always be directed towards the long term goal of making society more humane for everyone.

The challenge of harmonizing personal and collective interests is not trivial. How do we promote the unique identity and rights of a certain group without sacrificing solidarity with other oppressed groups? At which point do we turn our attention to other groups suffering from discrimination? How do we balance attention to processes of dialogue with outcomes of social justice? At which point do we say that we have discussed differences of opinion long enough and that now it is time for action, even if there is not consensus about members of a coalition? (Benhabib, 1996; Jaggar, 1994). All these questions involve values and cannot be answered in the abstract, for each unique constellation of factors requires a unique solution. The framework presented in table 3 is a place to start because it identifies three essential values: personal, collective, and relational; values that Giddens recognized as vital for Aan ethics of a globalizing post-traditional society@ (1994, p. 253). Giddens promotes these values because they imply a Arecognition of the sanctity of human life and the universal right to happiness and self-actualization -- coupled to the obligation to promote cosmopolitan solidarity and an attitude of respect@ (1994, p. 253).

Table 1 is also helpful in balancing values in that it draws our attention to four complementary basic sets of considerations: philosophical, contextual, needs, and pragmatic. Together, tables 1 and 3 offer a blueprint for balancing values in our discourse and action.

My reading of values in the field may not be accurate, but my primary objective is not to offer a conclusive but rather a formative evaluation of community psychology's values. My purpose in conducting this exploratory evaluation of community psychology's values is to generate discussion among researchers and practitioners as to where we should go next. I hope this assessment is the subject of relational dialogue. At the very least, I hope this framework can give us the language we need to discuss values with the same sophistication we probe research methods and statistical analyses.

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Table 1

Complementary Considerations for the Pursuit of Values in Community Psychology

Considerations

Key Question

State of Affairs

Explored

Main Voice

Analytical Resources

Outcomes

Philosophical

What should be?

Ideal vision

Moral and political philosophers

Philosophical discourse

Vision of good life and good society

Contextual

What is?

Actual state

Social scientists

Survey of economic, social, and cultural trends

Identification of prevailing norms and social conditions

Needs

What is missing?

Desirable state

Community members

Grounded theory and lived experience

Identification of human needs

Pragmatic

What can be done?

Feasible change

Agents of change

Resource mobilization and social change theory

Social change strategies

Table 2

Framework for Evaluating Community Psychology=s Attention to Complementary Considerations of Values

Considerations

Level of Attention

Low

Moderate

High

Philosophical

Contextual

Micro-level

Meso-level

Macro-level

Needs

Micro-level

Meso-level

Macro-level

Pragmatic

Micro-level

Meso-level

Macro-level

Table 3

Framework for Evaluating Community Psychology=s Attention to Personal, Collective, and Relational Values

Values

Discourse

Action

Personal

Low Moderate High

Collective

Micro-level

Meso-level

Macro-level

Relational

Micro-level

Meso-level

Macro-level

Table 4

Potential Balance of Power Among Values in an Individualistic Society

Values

States of Affairs

Actual State

Desirable State

Ideal Vision

Feasible Change

Personal

very high

high

moderate

high

Collective

very low

moderate

Relational

low

high

Table 5

Potential Balance of Power Among Values in a Collectivist Society

Values

States of Affairs

Actual State

Desirable State

Ideal Vision

Feasible Change

Personal

very low

high

moderate

low to moderate

Collective

very high

low

moderate

moderate to high

Relational

low

high

Table 6

Guidelines for Promoting a Balance Among Personal, Collective, and Relational Values in Community Psychology Interventions

Values

Guidelines

Personal

Self-determination

Health

Personal growth

Promote the ability of community members to pursue their chosen goals in life in consideration of other people=s needs

Promote the physical and emotional well-being of individuals through acquisition of skills and behavioral change in consideration of structural and economic factors impinging on the health of the population at large.

Promote the personal growth of community members in consideration of vital community structures needed to advance individual health and self-actualization.

Collective

Social justice

Support for community

Promote fair allocation of bargaining powers, resources, and obligations in society in consideration of people=s differential power, needs and abilities.

Promote vital structures that meet the needs of entire communities in consideration of the risks of curtailing individual freedoms and fostering conformity and uniformity.

Relational

Respect for diversity

Collaboration and democratic participation

Promote respect and appreciation for diverse social identities and unique oppressions in consideration of need for solidarity and risk of social fragmentation.

Promote peaceful, respectful, and equitable processes of dialogue whereby citizens have meaningful input into decisions affecting their lives, in consideration of need to act and not just avoid conflicts.

Table 7

Actualization of Values in Policies and Programs to Promote Child and Family Wellness

Values

Policies

Programs

Personal

Self-determination

Health

Personal growth

Devise child and family policies in consultation with children, families, and communities

Facilitate access to health care services through universal and outreach programs

Establish policies for teaching employment skills and for accessible recreational opportunities

Promote voice and choice of children and parents in selection and administration of programs

Establish networks of support and create self-help groups

Build into programs competency enhancing components for personal and occupational growth

Collective

Social justice

Support for community

Implement policies that provide adequate family benefits in order to eliminate child poverty

Promote policies that decrease work-family conflicts and that promote more integrated community-based services

Offer as part of preventive programs comprehensive supports that meet the needs for housing and economic security of disadvantaged families

Create awareness and support for creation and preservation of effective formal and informal supports

Relational

Respect for diversity

Collaboration and democratic participation

Promote inclusive family policies that do not discriminate on basis of marital status, gender, ability, sexual orientation, class, culture, or any other source of social power

Promote educational policies that teach importance of civic duties and skills required for meaningful participation in democracy

Consult with diverse groups of stakeholders and develop inclusive and culturally sensitive programs based on partnerships with the community

Foster climate of respect and develop skills for meaningful and democratic participation in programs